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COMMENT
COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL AND THE
INSANITY DEFENSE IN WYOMING--SOME PROBLEMS
The insanity defense has been a source of debate, confusion, and consternation at least since 1843 and Daniel
M'Naghten's Case.' Though an issue in only a small percentage of all criminal trials,2 the insanity defense has generated
a cornucopia of literature' suggesting changes ranging from
substantive alteration in the test of insanity and procedural
changes at trial, to abolition of the defense.
In a recent case involving the insanity defense, the Wyoming Supreme Court concluded:
This case exemplifies that society might better protect itself by a revision of our present laws and procedure when a defendant asserts the plea of insanity
upon the trial of a case.'
Assuming that a "revision of our present laws" is both imminent' and desirable, this comment will attempt to describe
some of the present problems and to anticipate the problems
involved in some of the available alternatives.
COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL:

FuLL

INSANITY AS A BAR TO A

ADJUDICATION OF THE CRIMINAL CHARGE

1. Competency and Responsibility Distinguished
Although the exculpation from criminal accountability
is the dominant and probably most widely recognized aspect
Copyright@ 1975 by the University of Wyoming
1. Queen Victoria was so dismayed by the acquittal of would-be assassins that
she called a special session of the House of Lords to clarify the decision in
M'Naghten's case. Out of this special session of the House of Lords came
what we today call the M'Naghten test. R. SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW
77 (1973).
2. A. MATTHEWS, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 30 (1969).
3. See, e.g., H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE (1954);
T. SzASz, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY (1963); A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967); H. FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL
INSANITY (1972); R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY
(1967); R. SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW (1973); Katz & Goldstein,
Abolish the Insanity Defese--Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853 (1963); Monahan, Abolish the Insanity Defense?-Not Yet, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 719
(1973); Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. REV.
514 (1968).
4. Reilly v. State, 496 P.2d 899, 905 (Wyo. 1972).
5. In reality the potential of an impending revision of the Wyoming Statutes
relating to the insanity defense is more than a bare assumption. As this
issue goes to press, the Wyoming legislature is considering legislation which
includes many of the subjects discussed in this comment.
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of insanity as it affects a criminal case, the mental capacity
of a defendant to stand trial is also subsumed under the "insanity defense" rubric. In Wyoming, the mental capacity or
competency of a defendant to stand trial is styled a plea"not triable by reason of present insanity.'
This competency plea, like the exculpatory plea of "not guilty by reason
of insanity" is to be made at the arraignment stage of the
criminal proceedings, although there is allowed a good-cause
delay in entering both pleas.7 The equality of statutory status
given both pleas, however, is misleading.
The test of the defendant's competency to stand trial is
set out in the Wyoming statutes:
The test of the capacity to stand trial shall be whether
the defendant has the capacity to comprehend his position, to understand the nature and object of the
proceedings against him, to conduct his defense in a
rational manner, and to cooperate with his counsel to
the end that any available defense may be interposed,
although on some other subject his mind may be deranged or unsound.8
This test comports with the competency test approved in
Dusky v. United States.' It is obvious "that this is by no
means the same test as those which determine criminal responibility at the time of the crime."'" The plea of "not triable
by reason of present insanity" is not a defense to the criminal
charge-it is a bar to full adjudication of the charge." Furthermore, while styled a plea in the Wyoming Statutes, the
incompetency of the defendant, as measured by the Dusky
test, is not really an answer to the criminal charge.
2. Duty to Determine Competence
It is well established that conviction of a defendant incompetent to stand trial is a violation of due process.' "A
6. WYO. STAT. § 7-240(b)
7. WYo. SraT. § 7-240(a)
8. WYo. STAT. § 7-241(C)
9.

(1957).
(1957).
(Supp. 1973).

362 U.S. 402 (1960).

10. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 389 (1965)
11.

WYO. STAT. § 7-240

(1957)

(Harlan, J., dissenting).

provides in part:

"All pleas of insanity as a

defense or a bar to prosecutions for the commission of crimes shall be
filed ....

." (emphasis added).

12. Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956).
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person cannot be tried, sentenced or punished for a public
offense while insane."' 3 Rather than being an answer by the
defendant to the criminal charge, it is the "threshold issue
in any case ...whether an accused is mentally competent to
waive his constitutional rights and plead to the charge or
stand trial. ... "" (emphasis added).
Solicitous of the constitutional right to a fair trial" and
due process considerations," the mechanics of insuring that
this threshold issue of competency is determined have been
fashioned accordingly. An affirmative duty has been placed
upon the trial judge.
[T] he trial court's duty flows from the constitutional
requirements of due process, Pate v. Robinson, 383
U.S. 375, as well as from 18 U.S.C.A. § 4244. And if
any information doming to the attention of the court
raises a bona fide doubt of the defendant's competency to waive his constitutional rights or plead or
stand trial, it is the inescapable duty of the court to
conduct a due process hearing to determine competency and to make appropriate findings. 7
Given its due process justification, the validity of this duty
imposed upon a trial court seems unquestionable.
This affirmative duty of the trial judge to determine
competency as a threshold issue is, however, not reflected
in the present Wyoming Statutes." Further, it seems that
a Wyoming judge attempting to effectively fulfill this duty
might be hindered by the statutory scheme.
3.

Problems-Competency to Plead Competency?

As described above, in Wyoming the compet ney issue is
a plea to be raised at the arraignment stage of the proceed13. WYo. STAT. § 7-239 (1957).
14. Wolcott v. United States, 407 F.2d 1149, 1150 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 879 (1969).
15. See Pate v. Robinson, supra note 10, at 385.
16. Bishop v. United States, upra note 12.
17. United States v. Bettenhausen, 499 F.2d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 1974).
18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970) provides for an examination regarding competency on the motion of the U.S. Attorney, defendant's counsel, or by the
court's own motion if there is any doubt as to competency "after arrest and
prior to the imposition of sentence .. .
18. WYo. STAT. § 7-239 et seq. (1957).
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ings, or later by leave of court. 9 The competency plea compels the trial judge to commit the defendant to the Wyoming
State Hospital "or other suitable institution" for an examination.'" This examination is to investigate the defendant's
present mental capacity to stand trial in light of Wyoming's
expanded version of the Dusky test.2
If the examination indicates the defendant is capable of
standing trial as guided by our competency test, the "court
shall proceed on the criminal charge" 2 2-the competency issue having been determined by the examination. If, however,
the examination concludes that the defendant is incompetent
to stand trial, a hearing is required, at which the competency
issue is to be determined.2 8
The triggering device to the procedure for determing
the competency issue is the plea of "not triable by reason of
present insanity." Without this plea there is no procedure
for determining the competency issue-and herein lies the
problem.
Our present law provides that the "defendant or someone in his behalf" may plead "not guilty by reason of insanity." 24 However, the statute does not stipulate who may
plead the competency issue--"not triable by reason of present insanity."2 5 The Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure
provide that in addition to other allowable pleas, "[a] defendant may plead.., not triable by reason of present insanity
. (emphasis added).
19. WYO. STAT. § 7-240(b) (1957).
20. WYo. STAT. § 7-241(A) (Supp. 1973). This commitment for purposes of
psychiatric examination is required also for the responsibility plea-"not
guilty by reason of insanity."
21. WYo. STAT. § 7-241(C) (Supp. 1973).
22. WYO. STAT. § 7-241 (C) (ii) (Supp. 1973). The finality of this examination is illustrated by Cosco v. State, 503 P.2d 1403 (Wyo. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 971 (1973).
23. WYo. STAT. § 7-241(C) (i) (Supp. 1973). If the hearing determines the
defendant incompetent to stand trial, the defendant must be committed to
the state hospital until certified competent. WYo. STAT. § 7-241 (C) (iii)
(Supp. 1973).
24. WYO. STAT. § 7-240(a) (1957).
25. WYO. STAT. § 7-240(b) (1957).This section provides: "A plea of 'not
triable by reason of present insanity' may be entered at the time of arraignment of defendant; provided that the court may permit such plea to
I e made at a later time for good cause shown .....
26. Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 15.
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If literally true that it is the defendant who must raise
the competency issue by pleading "not triable by reason of
present insanity," the competency issue is rendered circuitous. As noted by the Supreme Court, "it is contradictory
to argue that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently 'waive' his right to have the court determine his capacity to stand trial."27 It is similarly contradictory to assert that a defendant who may be incompetent must
assert his right to have the competency issue determined by
pleading "not triable by reason of present insanity." A
scheme which would require an incompetent defendant to
take the initiative in having his own incompetency determined is perfectly circular.
On its face, the present Wyoming law suffers from this
circuity. However, in practical terms it is assumed that defendant's counsel would enter a plea of "not triable by reason
of present insanity"on behalf of a client whose competency is
in doubt. Though not explicitly allowed by our present law,
defense counsel's initiative in making this plea for his client
avoids this circuity. This procedure would allow the court
to assume its duty regarding the determination of the competency issue.
One can, however, postulate a situation in which avoidance of the circular circumstance posed by our present law
would be more difficult. Suppose a defense attorney has a
client whose competency the attorney questions. Suppose
further that the client adamantly opposes his attorney entering a plea28 of "not triable by reason of present insanity."
The quandry presented to defense counsel in this hypothetical
is obvious.
Defense counsel could inform the court of his predicament. In so doing, he places the onus on the court. If defense
counsel's doubts as to the competency of his client are suf27. Pate v. Robinson, supra note 10, at 384.
28. ABA CANONS OP PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 7. Ethical Consideration 7-7
provides: "A defense lawyer in a criminal case has the duty to advise his
client fully on whether a particular plea to a charge appears to be desirable
and as to the prospects of success on appeal, but it is for the client to
decide what plea should be entered and whether an appeal should be taken."
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ficient to raise a "bona fide doubt of the defendant's competency" in the court's mind, the court must shoulder its duty
to determine competency."° Assuming that the court is put
on notice of this bona fide doubt prior to the arraignment,
the statute prevents any determination of the competency
issue at this time.2
Restrained at this point, the court would await the arraignment. At the arraignment, in order to fulfill its duty
to determine competency, the court would "plead" the defendant "not triable by reason of present insanity." This
plea would be entered by the court, despite the fact that the
defendant refuses to allow his attorney to plead incompetency. s2
The "plea" having been entered by the court, the court
could then order the defendant examined and the competency
issue would be decided. It is only through this strained use of
the competency plea that the court could assume its duty to
determine competency.
4. Alternative
Wyoming seems to be the only jurisdiction in which
determination of the competency issue is expressly conditioned upon a plea of incompetency. There are, however,
several states which, like Wyoming, permit the issue of competency to be raised only at or after the arraignment of the
defendant. 3
29. United States v. Bettenhausen, supra note 17.
30. See text p. 231 eupra.
31. Our statutes provide for a commitment for examination regarding competency "where any plea of insanity is mzade . . . 21 WYO. STAT. § 7-241 (A)
(Supp. 1973). A plea of "not triable by reason of present insanity" can
only be made at the arraignment stage of the proceedings. WYO. STAT. § 7240(b) (1957). Further, the arraignment is theDistrict Court's first jurisdictional step in our process-the preliminary examination and initial
appearance held before the Justice Court. WYO. R. CRIM. P. 5 & 7.
32. This action by the court is not inconceivable. In Lynch v. Overholser, 369
U.S. 705, 707 (1962), the defendant, represented by counsel, tried to withdraw a plea of not guilty and plead guilty. "The trial judge refused to
allow the change of plea, apparently on the basis of the Hospital's report
that petitioner's commission of the alleged offense was the product of
mental illness."
33. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. Pao. LAW § 730.30 (McKinney 1971); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 1352 (1964); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-229 (Interim Supp. 1974);
KY. R. CRIM. P. 8.06.
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In some jurisdictions 4 the competency question is indeed a threshold issue. In these states, resolution of the
competency issue seems permissible prior to the arraignment
or even prior to the preliminary examination." No particular time being fixed for a competency determination, judges
in these jurisdictions do not face the problem of having to
await any particular stage of the process to undertake their
duty to resolve the question of competency.
While Wyoming's plea of incompetency presents the
circuity inherent in requiring a defendant to "plead" his
own incompetency, 6 these jurisdictions obviate the problem
of who may raise the competency issue. Some of these jurisdictions avoid the potential circuity in Wyoming's plea of
incompetency by simply not addressing who may raise the
competency question." In these jurisdictions there must be
a competency determination if there is any doubt as to the
defendant's mental capacity to stand trial. By not delineating
the source of this doubt or how this doubt must be expressed,
these states impliedly seem to allow the court to initiate
competency determining proceedings on its own-without
having to await any formal initiative taken by the defendant
or his counsel. Indeed, several states explicitly allow the
competency issue to be raised by the court on its own motion."
Adoption by Wyoming of a statute similar to those just
discussed would solve the problems involved as to who may
raise the competency issue and in fixing the competency issue
to one particular stage of the proceedings. However, a fur34. See. e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1368 (West 1970); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.020
(Supp. 1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1823 (Supp. 1972); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-13-3.1 (1953); ORE. REV. STAT. § 161.360 (1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 4814 (1974); ch. 198, § 6, [1974] Wash. Laws 3rd Ex. Sess. 451.
35. In some jurisdictions, a competency determination is provided for when
there is doubt as to competency "at any stage of the proceedings." See N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 41-13-3.1 (1953). Similarly representative language is found
in the California statute- "If at any time during the pendency of an action
and prior to judgment a doubt arises as to the sanity [competency] of the
defendant, the court must order the question as to his sanity [competency]
to be determined . . . ." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1368 (West 1970).

36. See text p. 233 supra.
37. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1368 (West 1970) ; NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1823
(Supp. 1972); ORE. REV. STAT. § 161.360 (1973).
38. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.020 (Supp. 1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-133.1 (1953); ch. 198, § 6, [1974] Wash. Laws 3rd Ex. Sess. 451; VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4814(a) (4) (1974).
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ther problem exists with respect to the timing of the competency issue. While the statutes mentioned seem to allow determination of competency at any stage, at what stage or
stages of the proceedings is the competence of the defendant
a necessary prerequisite!"
The competency of a defendant is unquestionably necessary for a constitutionally valid trial and conviction."0 Although generally termed competency "to stand trial," a defendant must also be competent to enter a constitutionally
valid plea of guilty. 1 Consequently, the competency of a
defendant seems a necessary prerequisite when the defendant
is called upon to plead-at the arraignment. A determination of competency in advance of the arraignment seems appropriate, especially in a case where doubt arises as to competency prior to the arraignment.
The question remaining is the necessity of raising and
determining the competency issue prior to or at the preliminary hearing. Good reason exists for suggesting that it
should be necessary for a defendant to be competent at the
preliminary examination as well as the pleading and trial
stages.
In Wyoming, the preliminary examination is an extremely important step in the criminal justice process. There
being no grand jury requirement in Wyoming," the importance of the preliminary examination is magnified. "In all
cases triable in the district court, except upon indictment,
the defendant shall be entitled to a preliminary examination. '

'

(emphasis added).

89. Certainly no one would argue that competency is necessary for a valid
arrest.
40. Bishop v. United States, supra note 12; Pate v. Robinson, supra note 10.
See WYO. STAT. § 7-239 (1957).
41. Pate v. Robinson, supra note 10.
42. WYo. CONsT. art. 1, § 9: "Hereafter, a grand jury may consist of twelve
men, any nine of whom concurring may find an indictment, but the legislature may change, regulate or abolish the grand jury system."
WYO. STAT. § 7-92 (1957): "No grand jury shall be summoned or required to attend at the sittings of any district court of this state, unless
the same shall be ordered by the district court or the judge thereof in
vacation or recess of said court, and directed by it or him to be summoned."
43. Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 7(a). Rule 7(a) supersedes Wyoming Statutes § 7-124
(1957), which provided exceptions to the necessity of a preliminary examination for felony cases.
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The preliminary examination has been deemed a "critical stage" of the criminal proceeding so that the right to
counsel is constitutionally necessary."' The defendant must
be allowed "reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel. '" "Plainly the guiding hand of counsel at the preliminary hearing is essential to protect the indigent accused
against an erroneous or improper prosecution."4
Though the right to counsel at the preliminary hearing is
unquestionable, the practical effects of this right seem diminished if the defendant is incompetent.47 The value of
this right to counsel seems open to question if the defendant
lacks "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding."48 A
defendant's beneficial utilization of this right to counsel is
dubious if he is unable "to cooperate with his counsel to the
end that any available defense may be interposed." 49 The
incompetency of the defendant at the preliminary hearing
may render nugatory the beneficial assistance the right to
counsel is supposed to afford."
44.
45.
46.
47.

Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
WYO. R. CaM. P. 7(a).
Coleman v. Alabama, supra note 44, at 9.
There is, however, some indication by the Supreme Court that perhaps
competency is not necessary at the preliminary examination. In describing
some of the functions of counsel at the preliminary hearing, it was said,
"Fourth, counsel can also be influential at the preliminary hearing in
making effective arguments for the accused on such matters as the necessity for an early psychiatric examination or bail." Coleman v. Alabama,
supra note 44, at 9.
If the Court was speaking of a psychiatric examination regarding
competency, the implication is that a defendant need not be competent at
the preliminary examination. However, the Court may have contemplated
a psychiatric examination regarding insanity as a defense, in which case
nothing has been said regarding competency.
48. Dusky v. United States, supra note 9, at 402.
49. WYo. STAT. § 7-241(C) (Supp. 1973).
50. Worthy of consideration in this context is the potential impact of a recent
California Supreme Court decision. In Gordon v. Justice Court, 12 Cal. 3d
323, 525 P.2d 72, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1974), the court condemned as constitutionally infirm the utilization of non-lawyer justices of the peace to
try misdemeanor cases involving possible jail sentences. The court noted
that "[s]ince our legal system regards denial of counsel as a denial of
fundamental fairness, it logically follows that the failure to provide a
judge qualified to comprehend and utilize counsel's legal arguments likewise must be considered a denial of due process." Justice of the peace
conduct preliminary examinations as well as try misdemeanors in Wyoming.
Wyo. STAT. § 7-409(a) (Supp. 1973). It could be argued that legal education is required of those who conduct preliminary hearings. Since the
right to counsel attaches at the preliminary hearing as well as trial, the
same sort of logical nexus exists for requiring legally qualified judges in
order to "comprehend and utilize counsel's legal argument," at the preliminary hearing.
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Assuming that. Wyoming could sense the necessity of a
competent defendant in order to effectuate the right to
counsel at the preliminary hearing,"' adoption of a statute
similar to those allowing a competency determination at any
stage of the proceeding could accomplish this end. However,
some question could arise as to the validity of raising and
determining competency at the preliminary examination under this kind of statute.
While providing for a resolution of the competency issue at any stage of the proceedings, these statutes describe
the court as the prime actor in the process. 2 Superimposed
on Wyoming's court system, it could be argued that the competency question should not be decided at the preliminary
hearing because the preliminary hearing is conducted by the
commissioner (justice of the peace), not the court. 3
The jurisdictional problem manifested by this kind of
potential argument has been obviated in two states clearly
allowing for competency determination at the preliminary
hearing. New Mexico avoids this problem by providing for
a transfer of the competency issue to the district court, if it
is not already there." Missouri expressly allows the commissioner as well as the court to determine the competency issue."
Adoption of a statute similar to those in New Mexico or
Missouri would cure the problems discussed in the present
Wyoming law, and would allow for competency determina51.

52.
53.
54.

55.

Like Wyoming, there are several other jurisdictions in which the competency of the defendant presumably cannot be raised at the preliminary
examination. These states allow raising and determining the competency
issue only after an information or indictment-i.e. after the preliminary
hearing. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1301 (Supp. 1973) ; ARIZ. R. CraM.
P. 11.2; ME. REV. STAT ANN. tit. 15, § 101 (Supp. 1974); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 178.405 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135:17 (Supp. 1973); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 29-20-01 (1974); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.37 (Baldwin 1974);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1162 (1958); S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 2338-2 (1967).
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1368 (West 1970).
Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 7(a).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-13-3.1 (1953) provides inter alia that "Jilf the
question [competency] is raised in a court other than the district court, the
proceeding shall be suspended and the cause transferred to the district
court."
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.020 (Supp. 1974) provides for a resolution of the
competency issue "[w]henever any judge or magistrate has reasonable
cause to believe that the accused has a mental disease or defect excluding
fitness to proceed . .. ."
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tion at or prior to the preliminary hearing should a court
decide competency is necessary at this stage of the proceed-

ing."
TiE

DEFENSE OF INSANITY:

EXCULPATION FROM

INSANITY AS AN

CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY

1. In Perspective
The substantive proposition that one is not responsible
for a criminal act done while insane in the legal sense is a
troublesome aspect of the criminal law and not without
critics. 7 The metamorphosis of an otherwise criminal act
by something so difficult to define and comprehend as insanity is also perplexing conceptually. Though problematic,
the idea embodied in the insanity defense is not a convolution of the common law and Daniel M'Naghten's Case. Historical antecedents of the insanity defense existed considerably prior to Daniel M'Naghten's acquittal by reason of
insanity."
Though troublesome and an important point of departure for commentators, the significance of the insanity defense in fact may be exaggerated. As noted previously, it is
thought that the defense of insanity is involved in only a
small percentage of all criminal trials." In Wyoming only
2 of 102 defendants who pleaded not guilty by reason of
insanity in a two year period were found by the state hospital
56. It should be noted that under the New Mexico statute a competency determination at or prior to the preliminary examination would seem to require
a stay of proceedings in justice court. transfer to the district court for
determination of competency, and then transfer back to the justice court
for completion or commencement of the preliminary hearing. Under the
Missouri statute the commissioner (justice of the peace) seemingly could
stay or continue the preliminary examination until after competency is
determined.
57. "Probably no branch of the criminal law has been the subject of so much
criticism and controversy as the defense of insanity." H. WFAHOFEN, supra
note 3, at 1.
58. "[[]t may be that Mohammedan law was the first to recognize insanity as
a defense to crime." J. BIGGs, THE GUILTY MIND 40 (1967).
Furthermore, M'Naghten's acquittal was not a novelty in English law.
"The first recorded insanity acquittal in English law occurred about a
thousand years ago, under a rule sparing from execution a killer who 'falls
out of his sense or wits.'" Dershowitz, Abolishing the Insanity Defense:
The Most Significant Feature of the Administration's Proposed Criminal
Code-An Essay, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 434, 436-37 (1973).
59. A. MATTHEWS, 8upra note 2, at 30.
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to be insane at the time of the crime."0 These two defendants
were not tried; rather they were transferred to mental hospitals in other states. 1 Only 74 of 102 were tried; and only
one of the defendants was acquitted by reason of insanity. 2
Nevertheless, there are some who suggest abolishing what
we know as the insanity defense. Chief among the arguments
for abolition seems to be the idea that the defense is based
on outmoded ethical considerations of punishment only for
those acts done with freedom of will."3 Secondly, it is suggested that the defense is unrealistic when viewed against
present psychiatric capabilities. 4 However convincing these
arguments are perceived, it is precisely the longevity of the
insanity defense which has led courts to retain it. 5
Assuming that a wholesale abrogation of the insanity defense will not be a result of any impending revision of Wyoming law,6" there are some aspects of our law in which
changes may be contemplated and made.
60. W. Lanthorn, Disposition of Court Observation Cases at Wyoming State
Hospital, 1970-72, July, 1973 (unpublished thesis in University of Wyoming
Coo Library), at 20.
61. Id. at 23.
62. Id. at 24.
63. "The concept of lack of 'free will' is both the root of origin of the insanity
defense and the line of its growth." United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d
969, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
64. For a summary of arguments for abolition of the defense, see Morris,
Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, supra note 3, at 544-47.
65. Three cases are often cited as preventing the abolition of the insanity defense. State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910); Sinclair v.
State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931) ; and State v. Lange, 168 La. 958,
123 So. 639 (1929). However, only Strasburg dealt with an attempt at
wholesale abolition of the defense.
The Strasbnrg court faced what appears to be the first legislative
attempt to abolish the defense. In declaring the statute unconstitutional
the court noted that the sanity of the defendant "is and always has been a
question of fact for the jury to determine, as much so as any other question
of fact bearing upon the responsibility of the accused for the occurrence
of the act relied upon as constituting the offense charged." State v. Strasburg, supra at 1022-23.
,
Abolition of the defense by judicial rather than legislative action was
considered and rejected as beyond the court's power in United States v.
Brawner, supra note 63, at 985-86.
66. Abolition of the insanity defense does not seem to be a step doomed to
fail, however. "The Supreme Court has never imposed a single insanity
formula in either state or federal courts; indeed, the High Court has never
clearly decided whether the Constitution requires that there be any insanity defense at all." Dershowitz, Abolishing the Insanity Defense: The
Most Significant Feature of the Administration'sProposed Criminal CodeAn Essay, supra note 58, at 437.
Though refusing to effect an abolition through judicial action, United
States v. Brawner intimates that abolition of the defense may be possible
through legislative enactment or constitutional amendment. United States
v. Brawner, supra note 63, at 985-86.
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2. The Standard

Although the standard for determining the competency
of a defendant is prescribed by the Wyoming Statutes,"7 the
standard for determining insanity sufficient to exculpate a
defendant from cirminal accountability is a creature of the
5 Wyoming
courts. Since at least 1916 and Flanders v. State,"
has followed the M'Naghten Rule.
The jury instruction approved in Flanders also contained
what is commonly referred to as the "irresistible impulse" or
volitional test of insanity. This volitional test requires that
the defendant have "sufficient will power to control his
acts," 9 in addition to the M'Naghten requirement of knowing the "nature and consequences "7 of the act and that the
act was wrong.
However, there seems some question of the status of the
"irrestible impulse" test in Wyoming as the court evidently
doubts having adopted the volitional alteration to the M'Naghten Rule.
Although we refer to Wyoming as having adopted the M'Naghten Rule, in at least two cases a modification has been suggested by this court, State v.
Riggle, 76 Wyo. 1, 298 P.2d 349, 367, rehearing denied, 76 Wyo. 1, 300 P.2d 567, certiorari denied,
325 U.S. 981, 77 S.Ct. 384, 1 L.Ed.2d 366; Flanders
v. State, 24 Wyo. 81, 156 P. 39, 44, rehearing denied,
156 P. 1121, by the inclusion of the so-called 'irresistible impulse' or 'uncontrollable act' test.7" (emphasis added).
67. WYo. STAT. § 7-241(C) (Supp. 1973).
68. 24 Wyo. 81, 156 P. 39, 44 (1916).
If the jury was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that, notwithstanding such mental condition, he knew and understood the nature
and consequences of his act, and knew that it was morally wrong
or forbidden by law, and, furthermore, that he had sufficent will
power to control his acts, then such partial insanity would not
constitute a legal excuse for his act.
The Wyoming court hinted at the M'Naghten Rule in discussing the presumption of sanity eight years earlier. State v. Pressler, 16 Wyo. 214, 92
P. 806, 809 (1907).
69. Flanders v. State, supra note 68.
70. Id.
71. Reilly v. State, supra note 4, at 904. There is another case which "suggests"
that "irresistible impulse" is a part of our law. In Cirej v. State, 24 Wyo.
507, 161 P. 556, 557 (1916), the court objected to only part of an instruction on the sanity issue-the portion not objected to consisting of the
necessity of having "sufficient will power to govern his action."
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Perhaps the court only "refer[s] to Wyoming as having
adopted the M'Naghten Rule" because the cases dealing with
the standard have not expressly "adopted" a standard, but
rather found no error in jury instructions containing a standard.7 2 There also seems to be no case in which the court has
been urged to change the standard used in Wyoming-whether
that standard be M'Naghten plus irresistible impulse or
M'Naghten sans the volitional aspect.
Had Wyoming specifically "adopted" the M'Naghten
Rule, the court would be faced with a relatively momentous
step in embracing a proposal for an alternative standard.
The prior case law in Wyoming does not however seem to
pose such a structured circumstance; and a court-made change
in our standard would not seem a paroxysm in the development of our case law. 73
The apparent lack of finality in the court's discussions
of the standard for insanity in Wyoming could also be salutary in any legislative attempt to adopt a standard. A legislature desirous of adopting an alternative standard could
arguably feel that it would not be overruling, by statute, a
clearly established judicial standard. The capacity of a legislature to adopt a standard other than M'Naghten seems beyond question, as there are at least twelve states"4 which have
72. Perhaps the closest the Wyoming court has come to adopting a standard
expressly is Flanders v. State, supra note 68, at 44. After paraphrasing a
jury instruction containing the M'Naghten and "irresistible impulse" tests,
the court opined: "That, in substance, we believe to be the rule of law in
such cases."
73. If faced with an argument for a change in the insanity standard, the
Wyoming court could allow for a change in the insanity standard without
adopting a different standard and without expressly having to overrule
prior cases. Such a change in the standard was accomplished in State v.
Grimm, 195 S.E.2d 637, 647 (W. Va. 1973). Rather than expressly overrule
the M'Naghten Rule and expressly adopt the American Law Institute test,
the court noted that the M'Naghten Rule "has been justifiably criticized."
The court continued, "We do not adopt any rigid language for the trial
courts to use in instructing or charging the jury in such cases, but simply
recommend that they adopt an approach based on the Model Penal Code
referred to herein and dispense with the more limited test of right and
wrong followed in the M'Naghten Rule." The court then noted it would
approve of an instruction which was in essence the American Law InstituteModel Penal Code test.
74. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.083 (1972) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-13 (1972);
IDAHO CODE § 18-207 (Supp. 1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-1-11
(Smith-Hurd 1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 25(a) (1972); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 552.030 (Supp. 1974); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-501 (1969);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.05 (McKinney 1967); ORE. REV. STAT. § 161.295
(1973) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 4801 (1974); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.15 (1971).
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adopted versions of the American Law Institute-Model Penal
Code test. 75
3. Burden of Proof
The Wyoming Statutes provide:
[T]he prosecution shall prove beyond a reasonable
doubt both the commission of the offense charged and
the sanity of the defendant at the time of the commission of the offense; provided that the state shall
be aided by the presumption that the defendant is
sane until evidence to the contrary is presented; and
the burden of first going forward and entering evidence of insanity shall be upon the defendant. 6
This statutory scheme for burden of proof on the sanity issue
is a codification of State v. Pressler," and places Wyoming
among that one-half of the states which also require the state
to prove the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.7"
Obviously, the other states require the defendant to prove
his insanity,7 9 the degree of proof generally being by a preponderance of the evidence."
A. Presumption of Sanity
The existence of a presumption of sanity seems univers75. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962): "(1) A person
is not reponsihle for criminal condict if at the time of such conduct as a
result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality rwrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law."
76. WYo. STAT. & 7-242(a) (1957).
77. Supra note 68, at 809.
78. Twenty-six states are listed as placinz the burden of proof on the prosecution. Pope v. State. 478 P.2d 801, 812-13 n.24 (Alaska 1970). See Annot.,
17 A.L.R.3d 146 (1968). However, Wisconsin ,now places the burden of
proof on the defpndant. See State v. Bergenthal, 47 Wis. 2d 668, 178
N.W.2d 16, 26 (1970).
79. Twenty-four states are listed as placinz the burden of proof on the defendant. Pope v. State, supra note 78. at 812 n.23. See Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 146
(1968). As noted above. Wisconsin is now among these states, bringing
their number to twenty-five.
80. Several states which place the burden of proof on the defendant provide
that the defendant prove his insanity "by the greater weight of the credible
evidence" or "to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury." State v. Bergenthai, supra note 78, at 26; Riggins. v. State, 226 Ga. 381, 174 S.E.2d 908,
91f1-11 (1970) ; and Clayton v. State, 45 Ala. App. 127, 226 So. 2d 671, 672
(1969).
Though such standards may seem synonymous with "by a preponderance" there is at least one court which thinks "to the reasonable satisfaction
of the jury" is a higher standard of proof than "by a preponderance."
State v. Johnson, 267 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Mo. 1954).
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ally recognized.8 Beyond this recognition, however, there
seems to be little agreement.82 Courts differ on the effect of
the presumption, the quantum of evidence necessary to erase
or rebut the presumption, and who decides if the presumption
has been rebutted or erased.
Perhaps the major question involving the presumption
of sanity is whether the effect of the presumption is substantive or procedural. If its effect is substantive, the presumption of sanity is a proposition "of substantive law governing
the entire proceeding. "" If the presumption's effect is procedural, the presumption of sanity "is simply a rule stating
that the defendant has the burden of producing evidence (or
of proving) his insanity at the time of the offense." 4
In Wyoming the presumption of sanity seems to be
clearly a procedural device requiring the defendant to first
come forward with evidence of his insanity at the time of
the crime. This procedural effect given the presumption in
Wyoming also eliminates any necessity of the state producing evidence on the sanity issue in its case in chief. In Wyoming the sanity of the defendant "is presumed, in the first
instance, to exist, and has the force of evidence sufficient, if
uncontradicted, to establish the sanity of the defendant. That
is, it makes a prima facie case, and nothing more .... ""
The substantive effect given the presumption of sanity
in other jurisdictions means that "the presumption abides
with the state throughout the case and continues even after
the defendant has made a sufficient showing to procure insanity instructions."8 Consequently, a substantive role given
the presumption purposes "that the presumption of sanity
81. "All of the courts in this country are in agreement that there is a pre-

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

sumption that all persons are sane and responsible for their acts at the
time of the commission of a criminal offense." Bradford v. State, 234 Md.
505, 200 A.2d 150, 152 (1964).
At least one court has been unable to agree on the effect to be given the
presumption of sanity. Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 268 A.2d 89
(1970).
C. MCCORMIcK, EVIDENCE § 346, at 830 (2d ed. 1972).
Id. at 830.
State v. Pressler, supra note 68, at 809.
State v. Wilson, 85 N.M. 552, 514 P.2d 603, 606 (1973).
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does not disappear and is not extinguished by evidence tending to show insanity." 87
A concomitant of the presumption and a reason for characterizing it as procedural in Wyoming is the fact that the
presumption of sanity exists only "until evidence to the contrary is presented.' "" Evidence presented by the defense of
the defendant's insanity "erases the initial presumption of
sanity. 8 9
As affected by the presumption of sanity, the Wyoming
scheme seems to be as follows: (1) "[A]ided by the presumption that the defendant is sane,"" the state produces no
evidence on the sanity issue in its case in chief, but rather
undertakes to prove the commission of the offense. (2) The
defense then introduces evidence of the defendant's insanity
at the time of the offense. (3) In its case in rebuttal, the
state then assumes its burden of proof on the sanity issue.
By virtue of the procedural device of the presumption of
sanity, the sanity vel non of the defendant seems not to be
at issue until the defense assumes "the burden of first going
forward and entering evidence of insanity.""
Though this is the path apparently intended for the introduction of evidence on and proof of the sanity issue, it
does not seem to be mandatory. In Gerard v. State 2 a different design was found permissible. In Gerard the state
introduced lay testimony which evidently "bore on the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense," in its case in
chief. The defendant then introduced expert testimony that
"the defendant was insane at the time of the commission of
the alleged offense, which views the State did not thereafter
controvert." 94
87. Id. at 606. See also, State v. Daniels, 106 Ariz. 497, 478 P.2d 522, 527
(1970).
88. WYo. STAT. § 7-242(a) (1957). See Reilly v. State, supra note 4, at 902.
89. Gerard v. State, 511 P.2d 99, 102 (Wyo. 1973).
90. WYO. STAT. § 7-242(a) (1957).
91. Wyo. STAT. § 7-242(a) (1957). See Hollander v. State, 296 N.E.2d 449,
452 (Ind. 1973). "It is only when the defendant challenges the presumption
with evidence of insanity that a question of fact is presented to the trier
of fact."
92. Supra note 89.
93. Id. at 102.
94. Id. at 102.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1975

17

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 10 [1975], Iss. 1, Art. 8

246

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. X

The role assumed by the presumption of sanity in Gerard
is indefinite at best. Because the state first breached the
sanity issue, the presumption did not operate to put upon
the defendant "the burden of first going forward and entering evidence of insanity.''" Similarly, the presumption of
sanity did not operate as a prima facie case for the state, as
evidence bearing on the sanity issue was entered in the state's
case in chief. Finally, there was no presumption to be erased
by defense evidence of insanity because the state in effect did
not utilize the presumption of sanity.
B. A Change in the Burden of Proof?
Whatever the impact of Gerard, it is certain that Wyoming imposes on the state the burden of proving the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt 9 -whether that burden arises before or after the introduction of evidence on the
sanity issue by the defendant. Assuming an impending revision of our present law, it is conceivable that a change in
the burden of proof would be considered.
A state's original imposition of the burden of proof on
the sanity issue on the state or the defendant and the degree
of proof necessary to sustain this burden do not seem to be
of constitutional dimension. Leland v. Oregon" sustained a
state placing the burden of proving insanity on the defendant
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Leland court noticed that Oregon had required the
defendant to prove his insanity since 1864, and had not opted
for the rule of Davis v. United States"8 placing the burden
of proof on the prosecution. 9 Davis v. United States was dispositive of the burden of proof as to sanity only in the federal
jurisdiction; and some states did not choose to adopt it.'
Recognizing that "beyond a reasonable doubt" is a relatively
95.

WYO. STAT. § 7-242(a)

(1957).

96. See State v. Pressler, supra note 68, at 809; Flanders v. State, supra note
68, at 44; Rice v. State, 500 P.2d 675, 676 (Wyo. 1972); Reilly v. State,
supra note 4, at 902.
97. 343 U.S. 790, 799 (1952).
98. 160 U.S. 469, 484 (1895).
99. Leland v. Oregon, supra note 97, at 796.
100. Id. at 797.
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higher standard of proof than that normally attached to the
defendant's burden of proof on this issue, Leland nevertheless
found that Oregon had not violated the constitution by imposing this standard on the defendant.1 '"
Twelve years after Davis v. United States, when originally faced with the choice of imposing the burden of proof
on the state or the defendant, Wyoming could have decided
that the defendant should have to prove his insanity. How0 2 decided to impose that burden of
ever, State v. Pressler"
proof on the state--where it has remained.'
As Leland
makes clear this initial choice involves no constitutional restraints. A potential question however, is the ability of a
state to renege on that orginal choice and impose the burden
of proof of the sanity issue on a different party. Leland provided no guidance on this question, since Oregon had not
changed its original imposition of the burden of proof, but
rather the degree of proof required.'"
C. Colorado and Wisconsin
A subsequent change in the imposition of the burden of
proof of the sanity issue has been effected or attempted in
at least two states-Colorado and Wisconsin. Like Wyoming,
both states had initially imposed the burden of proof on the
state rather than the defendant.0 5
In Colorado, the impetus to change the original placement of the burden of proof came from the legislature and
was rebuked by the judiciary. In People ex rel. Julan v. District Court, Colorado was faced with a legislative enactment
which would "require a defendant who enters a plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity to establish, by a preponderance
of evidence, the fact of insanity.' 01°
In holding this statute unconstitutional, the Juhan court
reaffirmed a number of Colorado cases requiring the state
to bear the burden of proof on the sanity question.
101. Id. at 798-99.
102. Sup'ra note 68.
103. WYO. STAT. § 7-242(a) (1957).
104. Leland v. Oregon, supra note 97, at 796.
105. State v. Esser, 16 Wis. 2d 567, 115 N.W.2d 505, 516 (1962); Ingles v.
People, 92 Colo. 518, 22 P.2d 1109, 1111 (1933).
106. 165 Colo. 253, 439 P.2d 741, 743 (1968).
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As thus interpreted by the judiciary over the years
the due process clause of the state constitution includes the doctrine that the state must prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the accused cannot be required by legislative enactment to prove his
insanity or any other defense by a preponderance of
the evidence."0 7
The longevity of the requirement that the state shoulder
the burden of proof of sanity seemed a significant fact in
the Juhan decision. The court characterized this requirement as "a 'fundamental' doctrine by long continued adherence thereto, which has brought that concept within the coverage of the due process clause of the state constitution...., 0 8
(emphasis added). The Juhan decision seems to posit a dueprocess-equals-history rationale for upholding a state's original imposition of the burden of proof.
Unlike Colorado, the stimulus for a change in the imposition of the burden of proof in Wisconsin from the state to
the defendant originated with the judiciary. Two years prior
to the Juhan decision, State v. Shoffner initially allowed for
a change in the placement of the burden of proof in Wiscon°9
sin.1
Perhaps the primary basis for the Shoffner decision was
the argument over the adequacy or inadequacy of the insanity
standardused in Wisconsin by virtue of State v. Esser."O The
Shoffner court noted "we have not been convinced that the
Esser definition, coupled with the rule imposing upon the
state the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is producing unjust results, and we are not convinced that the Esser
definition should be changed."1 .' Nevertheless, Shoffner pre107.
108.

109.
110.

111.

Id. at 745.
Id. at 745. The Juhan court vehemently dismissed Leland v. Oregon as
inapposite. The court stated that it was construing due process viz. Colorado: "We are not in the least concerned with what it meant in the state
of Oregon in 1864, or any time thereafter."
31 Wis. 2d 412, 143 N.W.2d 458 (1966).
Supra note 105, at 522. "The term 'insanity' in the law means such an abnormal condition of the mind, from any cause, as to render the defendant
incapable of understanding the nature and quality of the alleged wrongful
act, or incapable of distinguishing right and wrong with respect to such
act."
Three judges in the Shoffner case supported the adoption of the American Law Institute definition. State v. Shoffner, sup'ra note 109, at 464.
State v. Shoffner, supra note 109, at 463-64.
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scribed a procedure whereby a defendant could be tried
under the American Law Institute (ALl) test if he chose to
do So.112
The position of the burden of proof was evidently viewed
by the Shoffner court as an integral part of the standard or
definition of insanity. Under the Shoffner procedure,"' a
defendant could elect to be tried under the ALL test only if he
"assume [d] the burden of proof on the insanity issue .... ""'
In 1969, this transposition of the burden of proof was made
law in Wisconsin by a statute adopting the ALL test of insanity and placing the burden of proof on the defendant.115
D. Implications for Wyoming
Assuming an attempt to transpose the burden of proof
of sanity from the state to the defendant and analogizing
from the Colorado and Wisconsin experiences in this context,
several implications and conclusions are available. Conceptually, the Colorado and Wisconsin cases pose an important
issue: whether the question of the position of the burden of
proof is to be viewed as sui generis, as in Juhan; or as a concomitant and outgrowth of the test for insanity applicable
in the jurisdiction, as in Shoffner. Perhaps determinative of
this conceptual question is the manner in which the issue is
framed: whether the question of the position of the burden
of proof is raised as a distinct and general proposition-as in
Ju han-or in conjunction with the question of which insanity
standard is to be applied-as in Shoffner.
An attempt by Wyoming's legislature to alter the position of the burden of proof without suggesting an alternative
insanity standard would be problematic under either the
112. Id. at 464.
113. "Accordingly, we direct that where a defendant pleads not guilty by reason
of insanity, presents evidence that as a result of mental disease or defect
... he lacks substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law, desires to be tried under the American Law Institute definition of
the defense, and is willing to carry the burden of proof on the issue, he is
to be permitted to waive such provisions of sec. 957.11 (1) and (2), Stats.,
as place the burden of proof on the insanity issue on the state, and have
the jury instructed in terms of the American Law Institute definition."
(emphasis added). State v. Shoffner, supra note 109, at 465.
114. State v. Shoffner, supra note 109, at 464.
115. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.15 (1971).
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Juhan or Shoffner conceptions of the issue. Since the position of the burden of proof of sanity in Wyoming was clearly
established in 1907,11 a court faced with this legislative action could find that the imposition of this burden on the
state had become a constitutional right on the basis of the
Juhan reasoning. Also troublesome is the prospect of a legislature statutorily overruling a long established judicial rule.
Under the Shoffner rationale, this legislative action could
also be difficult. A Wyoming court could decide that it is
our version of the M'Naghten Rule which imposes the burden
of proving the defendant's sanity on the state; and that without a change in the test there can be no change in the position
of the burden of proof.
A legislative attempt to change both the insanity standard and the position of the burden of proof is presumably
possible. If it is true that the Wyoming court has not clearly
and specifically adopted an insanity standard, the spectre of
a legislature overruling judicially created rules would seem
diminished. The Shoffner conception of the burden of proof
being an adjunct of the standard could be utilized to validate
this action.
The Wyoming court could, however, decide that legislative adoption of a standard is not untoward legislative action, and nevertheless invalidate a change in the burden of
proof on the basis of the Juhan reasoning. Conceiving of the
placement of the burden of proof as distinct from the issue
of the standard to be applied, the Juhan reasoning could be
applied to defeat a change in the position of the burden.1 1
3. Procedure at Trial
Following the commitment and examination of a defendant who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity,1 1 the Wyo116. State v. Pressler, supra note 68.
117. If the legislature should adopt the American Law Institute-Model Penal
Code standard, a court could buttress its Juhan reasoning with the Model
Penal Code provisions on burden of proof. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Though styled an affirmative defense, the
defendant under the Model Penal Code has only the burden of first going
forward with evidence of insanity-just as he must do so under Wyoming's
present law.
118. WYo. STAT. § 7-241 (A) (Supp. 1973). "In all cases where any plea of
insanity is made, the judge shall forthwith order the commitment of the
defendant to the Wyoming state hospital or other suitable institution for
observation and examination . .. .
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ming Statutes provide: "there shall be... a single trial upon
the issue of the commission of the crime, and at such trial
the defendant may present any defenses he may choose, including that of insanity at the time of the commission of the
alleged offense.""'0 (emphasis added). At this "single trial"
"both the commission of the offense charged and the sanity
of the defendant at the time of the commission of the offense"' - must be proved.
This statute requiring the consolidation of issues in a
"single trial" is an amended version of the statute in force
until 1951. Prior to 1951, the Wyoming Statutes required
two trials-one on the issue of defendant's sanity and the
other on the commission of the offense. In a case where the
defendant had pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, the
pre-1951 statute required that:
The Court shall thereafter order a trial of the defendant upon such plea only, which trial shall be by jury
in the same manner as criminal cases are tried. If
upon such trial, the defendant be found sane, such
finding or verdict shall be final and conclusive, and
said defendant shall then be tried for the offense
charged in the same manner as if said plea had not
been made, either before the same jury, or before a
new jury, in the discretion of the court."'
Viewed from this pre-1951 perspective, the words "single
trial" in the present statute take on added significance. However, the difficulites engendered by the "single trial" procedure become apparent only when this procedure is viewed
in its relationship with the mandatory psychiatric examination of the defendant and the testimony of the examining
expert at trial.
A. The Problem
Like several other jurisdictions, Wyoming requires a
court-ordered psychiatric examination of a defendant relying
119. WYo. STAT. § 7-242
(1957).
120. WYO. STAT. § 7 -242(a) (1957).
121. Ch. 83, § 3 [1939] Wyo. Sess. Laws (amended
Rouse, 58 Wyo. 468, 134 P.2d 1116 (1943).
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on the defense of insanity." Though challenged on Fifth
Amendment and due process grounds, the constitutional validity of these examinations is universally recognized. 2 However, "The difficult question is whether inculpatory statements or confessions of the accused respecting the crime
charged, made during the psychiatric interview and examination, may be introduced in evidence.. 2 4
Plainly, the psychiatric expert needs to ask questions
about the facts surrounding the alleged crime and the subjective feelings of the defendant in order to form an opinion
as to the mental condition of the defendant at the time of the
offense. Also clear is the necessity of a defendant responsively answering these questions in order for the examination
to be complete and thorough. "Psychiatric examinations are
greatly dependent upon testimonial utterances of the person
examined." 2 5
The response given to the psychiatric expert's questions
are likewise necessary and helpful in order for the trier of
fact to determine the basis for the expert's opinion. These
responses, as related by the expert, could also aid the trier
of fact in its own determination of the issue of defendant's
sanity.
In addition to their usefulness on the issue of defendant's
mental condition, the statements made by a defendant during
a psychiatric examination may also provide some credible
indications of guiJt. In answering the questions posed during
the psychiatric examination a defendant may admit the com122. WYo. STAT. § 7-241 (A) (Supp. 1973). Other states which require this
examination are: Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1301 (Supp. 1973);
Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-8-2(1) (1963); Idaho, IDAHO CODE
§ 18-211 (1) (Supp. 1973); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3219(2) (Supp.
1973); Montana, MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. § 95-505(1)

(Supp. 1974); Oregon,

ORE. REv. STAT. § 161.315 (1973); South Dakota, S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
§ 23-37-2 (1967).
123. "In recent years when statutes requiring or permitting court order for
psychiatric examination of an accused have been attacked as transgressing
the privilege against self-incrimination, the attacks have been rejected
uniformly." State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763, 770 (1965). See
State v. Riggle, 76 Wyo. 1, 298 P.2d 349, 373-74 (1956); State v. Spears,
76 Wyo. 82, 300 P.2d 551, 563 (1956); State v. Myers, 220 S.C. 309, 67
S.E.2d 506, 507 (1951); Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817, 819 (Fla. 1970);
People v. Schranz, 50 Mich. App. 227, 213 N.W.2d 257, 261 (1973).
124. State v. Whitlow, supra note 123, at 770.
125. Parkin v. State, 8upra note 123, at 822.
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mission of the crime or incriminate himself with respect to
the crime. It is this additional potential of the expert's testimony on the sanity issue which gives rise to difficulty.
Clearly if such statements by the accused are introduced
through the examining expert's testimony for the purpose of
showing the basis of the expert's opinion or as evidence of
mental condition, such statements are competent evidence. If
introduced for these purposes, the testimony of the expert relating statements made by the defendant is not hearsay.
These statements are not being introduced "as evidence of
the factual truth which may be contained in them. 7;126
However, the characterization of the purpose for the
expert' s testimony does not describe its possible effect. If the
trier of fact is to determine both the commission of the crime
and the sanity of the defendant in a simultaneous trial of
these issues, the potential effect of expert testimony containing admissions or incriminating statements is obvious and
troublesome.
By his testimony on the sanity issue, the expert may presage or buttress a jury finding of guilt-in-fact. By responding to questions at a court-ordered examination of his mental
condition, a defendant may inculpate himself in the crime
charged because of the potential effect of the examining
expert's testimony. The implications of the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination in this context
have not gone unnoticed." 7
To vitiate this potential effect of statements made by
the accused, it has been suggested that a limiting instruction
be given the jury. Though these statements are admissible, the
jury is instructed that "Their function or probative force,
however, is limited to the sanity issue and may not be used
126. Id. at 822.
127. See, e.g., Berry, Self-Incrimination and the Compulsory Mental Examina.
tion: A Proposal, 15 ARIZ. L. REv. 919 (1973) ; Note, Requiring a Criminal
Defendant to Submit to a Government Psychiatric Examination: An Invasion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 83 HARv. L. REv. 648
(1970); Comment, Compulsory Mental Examinations and the Privilege
Against Self-incrimination, 1964 WIs. L. REV. 671.
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as substantive evidence of guilt." 2 8 In effect the jury is told

that an inculpatory statement is not incriminating: the efficacy in fact of such a limiting instruction is at least arguable. 29 "The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can
be overcome by instructions to the jury . . . all practicing

lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction ...
B. Wyoming
State v. Riggle'3 illustrates that both the purpose for
which a defendant's statements are used and their effect
may be unrelated to the sanity issue. In Riggle the accused
told the examining expert that he had served time in the state
penitentiary. The prosecutor then used this revelation to the
expert as a basis for impeaching the defendant's reputation
for truth and veracity.
The Wyoming court noted:
True, it does not appear that the defendant had been
warned that evidence might be used against him.
But it does not appear that any compulsion was used
when defendant made the statement. Itwas merely
a collateral fact, not an admission of his guilt of the
crime charged herein, and no warning was necessary
if, as a matter of fact the evidence was voluntarily
made as appears to be true in the case at bar. " '
The court went on to note that the insanity plea makes
relevant a wide variety of evidence. "The plea of insanity
made relevant all the incidents of defendant's life from the
cradle to the time of trial." '
3 4 a similar view was taken by the
In State v. Spears,"
court.
A defendant in a criminal case is not required to
plead insanity; but when he does so, by his plea, be
State v. Whitlow. supra note 123, at 770; State v. Obstein, 52 N.J. 516,
247 A.2d 5, 13 (1968)..
-.............
129. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968).
130. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring), quoted in Bruton v. United States, eupra note 129, at 129.
131. Supra note 123.
132. Id. at 364.
133. Id. at 368-69.
134. 76 Wyo. 82, 300 P.2d 551 (1956).
128.
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submits himself to the examination prescribed by
statute and thereby permits the results of such examination to be presented to the court.1 35 (emphasis
added).
The Wyoming court does not appear to have dealt with
an admission or a statement implicating the defendant in the
crime charged in the expert's testimony. However, implicit
in Riggle and Spears is the suggestion that, by pleading insanity the defendant engages in some sort of waiver with
respect to his responses to questions in the mandatory psychiatric examination. This kind of analysis seem to place a premium on the plea of insanity.
As a consequence, it is possible that some day a defendant
may plead insanity and then refuse to respond to questions
during the court-ordered psychiatric examination." 6 This
circumstance would render nugatory the very real assistance
the expert could provide on the question of defendant's sanity,
and pose a difficult question for the court.
In order to preserve the beneficial assistance the courtordered examination can provide, the court could condition
the testimony of the defendant's expert on the defendant
responding to questions in the court-ordered psychiatric investigation."' However, this kind of leverage would obtain
only if the defendant were sufficiently affluent to have engaged his own psychiatric expert.
Barring this situation, the court would face a set of difficult options: (1) The court could allow the case to go to
trial and there permit the state to prove defendant's refusal
to respond to the examiner's questions. Akin to comment on
defendant's failure to testify, the constitutional propriety of
135. Id. at 564.
136. See, e.g., Parkin v. State, supra note 123, at 818; French v. District Court,
153 Colo. 10, 384 P.2d 268, 269-70 (1963).
137. Parkin v. State, 8upra note 123, at 822. "In answer to the question certified to us by the District Court, we hold that, where a defendant in a
criminal case serves notice that she will rely upon the defense of insanity
and the court over her objections orders her to give testimonial response to
the court-appointed psychiatrists under pain of forfeiting the testimony of
her privately-engaged psychiatrist, the defendant's rights to freedom from
self-incrimination are not invaded."
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this option seems extremely doubtful. 8 (2) The court could
accept the defendant's refusal to respond, negativing the potential of expert assistance on the sanity question. The court
would seemingly have to resign itself to a trial of the sanity
issue based entirely on lay testimony. (3) The court could
attempt to deny the defendant's utilization of the insanity
defense at trial unless he responds to the questions posed in
the court-ordered examination. An exercise of this option
would appear doomed to failure. In French v. Dist-riot
5 9 the court was faced with this situation:
Court,"
A person accused of crime who enters a plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity, cannot be compelled to
carry on conversations against his will under the
penalty of forfeiture of the defense for failure to
respond to questions or for a refusal to 'cooperate'
with persons appointed to examine him. The statute which prescribes the procedure to be followed
upon the entry of a plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity cannot operate to destroy the constitutional
safeguards against self-incrimination. 4 '
C. A Solution-The Bifurcated Trial
Viewed from one perspective, it is the court-ordered
psychiatric examination which creates the problems just discussed. Without examination, these problems would not exist.
However, the insight the expert can provide into the difficult
and complex issue of the accused's mental condition at the
time of the offense is invaluable. And, as previously noted,
courts have been unwilling to find anything constitutionally
wrong with the examination itself. It is not the original reception of a defendant's statements which creates difficultyit is their subsequent use at trial. Viewed from this perspective, the defendant's disclosures at the psychiatric examination create problems because- of the context in which these
disclosures are presented-in a simultaneous trying of both
the guilt and sanity issues.
138. State v. Whitlow, supra note 123, at 774. The Whitlow court noted that
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) and Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964)i cast grave doubt on proof of defendant's refusal to respond to
questions at the court-ordered psychiatric examination.
139. 153 Colo. 10, 384 P.2d 268 (1963).
140. Id. at 270.
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The obvious alternative to Wyoming's "single trial" procedure is a trial in which the issues of guilt and sanity are
separated. This separation of issues is commonly called a
"bifurcated" trial and is provided for by statute in California, Colorado and Wisconsin.1 4 1 Similar to Wyoming's
pre-1951 statute, Colorado requires the issue of sanity to be
tried first, and the guilt issue second, with provision for a
second jury. 4 In California and Wisconsin, the guilt issue
is determined first and the sanity issue second.'
This separation of guilt and sanity can effectively preempt the problems discussed in the single trial procedure.
The problem of a defendant's admissions or incriminating
statements being admitted for the purpose of showing the
basis of expert testimony or as evidence of mental condition,
but having the potential effect of helping to establish guilt,
is avoided. Because the guilt issue has been determined without evidence of sanity or is reserved for a second jury to determine, the potential prejudicial effect of defendant's inculpatory statements at the psychiatric examination is nullified. Similarly, a defendant who may fear the subsequent use
and effect of his answers to questions posed in a psychiatric
interview would have little or no reason to refuse answering
these questions since these statements could not affect a
jury finding of guilt.
As one court has noted, this severance of the guilt and
sanity issues,
is provided in order to protect the accused from prejudice which might arise in the minds of a jury trying both the issue of guilt and of mental condition.
Separate trials of these issues are provided to safeguard, so far as possible, against the prejudice likely
to arise by reason of the wide variety of evidence
which might be competent on the issue of insanity
and which would not be admissible upon the trial of
the not guilty plea.'4 4
141. California, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026 (West 1970); Colorado, COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 39-8-3 & 39-8-4 (1963); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.
175 (1971).
142. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-8-3 & 39-8-4 (1963).
143. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026 (West 1970); WIS. STAT. ANN § 971.175 (1971).
144. Trujillo v. People, 150 Colo. 235, 372 P.2d 86, 88 (1962).
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D. Problems in Separating Guilt and Sanity
Again assuming a revision of present Wyoming law, it
is possible that Wyoming would return to the idea embodied
in the pre-1951 statute-a severance of the guilt and sanity
issues for purposes of trial. This separation of issues could
be seen as a prejudice-preventing device and embraced as a
part of any impending review of Wyoming law. Although the
bifurcation of a trial involving the insanity defense can
rectify some problems, it should not be looked upon as a panacea. "Bifurcated trial procedures have been challenged on
1
due process grounds wherever they have been employed." "
As two eminent commentators point out,' 6 a significant
facet of the debate over bifurcated trials is the way in which
the insanity defense is perceived. The end result of establishing the fact of legally sufficent insanity at the time of
the offense is the exculpation of the accused from criminal
sanctions. The question is whether this lack of criminal responsibilty is the issue to be determined or only a result of
this determination. Professors Louisell and Hazard indicate
that the insanity of the defendant may be viewed as bearing
on the capacity of the defendant to commit a crime or on the
responsibilty of the defendant for committing a crime." 7
This dichotomy may be significant in determining the severability of sanity from guilt.
If insanity relates to the capacity to commit crime, then
insanity must be considered in determining -the "guilt" of
the defendant." 8 A person incapable of committing a crime
because of his insanity cannot be "guilty" of a crime. Consequently, "guilt" and sanity are inseparable.
If, on the other hand, insanity relates to the responsibility
of the defendant for a crime, insanity need not be considered
Comment, Due Process and Bifurcated Trials: A Double Edged Sword, 66
Nw. U.L. REv. 327, 328 (1971). Compare State v. Shaw, 106 Ariz. 103, 471
P.2d 715 (1970) with State v. Hebard, 50 Wis. 2d 408, 184 N.W.2d 156
(1971).
146. Louisell & Hazard, Insanity as a Defense: The Bifurcated Trial, 49 CALIF.
L. REV. 805 (1961).
147. Id. at 805-06.
148. Id.
145.
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By virtue of this
in determining a defendant's "guilt.'..
analysis, a person can be "guilty" of a crime if he is insane,
but he cannot be held responsible. Therefore, it is possible to
separate "guilt" and sanity.
Notwithstanding the usefulness of this capacity-responsibility dichotomy, the ability to separate "guilt" from sanity
and the validity of bifurcated trials can be decided on the
basis of the relationship between insanity and intent. Arizona
has invalidated its bifurcated trial procedure, while Wisconupheld on the basis of the intent-insanity relationsin's was
10
ship.
In State v. Shaw151 Arizona's bifurcated trial procedure
was deemed violative of due process because of the court's
view that insanity precludes intent. The Arizona procedure,
like California and Wisconsin, required that guilt be determined first and sanity second, evidence of insanity being
restricted to the second stage of the trial.
The Arizona court reasoned that:
To prohibit the introduction of any or all the evidence bearing on proof of insanity at the trial of
guilt or innocence would deprive a defendant of the
opportunity of rebutting intent, premeditation, and
malice, because an insane person could have none. 5 '
The court proposed that this prohibition of evidence of insanity at the guilt stage "gives rise to a presumption of intent,
premeditation, or malice which runs counter to the commonContinulaw and constitutional concepts of criminal law.'"
ing, the Shaw court reasoned that since "The second trial is
limited solely to the question of legal insanity,"" 4 this "presumption of intent" becomes conclusive and is "in violation
of due process, as was pointed out in Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246 .

""

Bolstering and perhaps com-

149. Id.
150. Arizona, State v. Shaw, supra note 145; Wisconsin, State v. Hebard, supra
note 145.
15t. Supra note 145.
152. Id. at 724.
153. Id.
154. Id.

155. Id.
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pelling the Shaw decision is an Arizona statute requiring
that "In every crime or public offense there must exist a
union or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal
negligence"."'
Criticizing the Shaw logic, the Wisconsin court upheld
the bifurcated trial against constitutional challenge in State
v. Hebard.5 " ' The Wisconsin court did not find the Shaw
view of the intent-insanity relationship persuasive. The
Hebard court does not view insanity as negativing intent.
"[A] court finding of legal insanity is not a finding of inability to intend; it is rather a finding that under the applicable standard or test, the defendant is to be excused from
Under this view, the
criminal responsibility for his acts." '
preclusion of insanity evidence at the guilt trial is permissible."5 9
Under the Hebard rationale, intent can be determined
without reference to insanity because insanity relates only
to the defendant's responsibility. Under the Shaw reasoning,
intent cannot be determined without reference to insanity because insanity precludes intent.
Whether initial formulations or post hoe justifications,
the conflicting views of the insanity-intent relationship represented by Shaw and Hebardcould provide guidance should the
Wyoming Legislature decide to reinstate the bifurcated trial.
Faced with a constitutional challenge to a statute requiring
a bifurcated trial and prohibiting evidence of insanity at the
trial of the guilt issue, the Wyoming court could arguably
subscribe to either the Shaw or Hebard rationales.
Presented with such a challenge, the Wyoming court
could dismiss Shan, as inapposite because Wyoming has no
statute requiring a "union or joint operation of act and intent.' '..
Although the necessity of some kind of mens rea
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN § 13-131 (1956).
Supra note 145.
Id. at 163.
See Curl v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 474, 162 N.W.2d 77 (1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 1004 (1969).
160. AIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-131 (1956).
156.
157.
158.
159.
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requirement has recently been affirmed in State v. Stern,'
the Wyoming court could assert the inappropriateness of
viewing insanity as precluding capacity to commit crime or
form criminal intent. Viewing insanity as relevant only to
the question of the accused's criminal responsibility, a separation of guilt and sanity could be upheld on the basis of
Hebard.
Alternatively, it could be argued that Wyoming views
the sanity and guilt issues as inseparable. A cogent argument
could be made that since the state must prove the defendant's
sanity as well as the commission of the crime, the sanity of
the accused is an integral part of the guilt determination.'
In order to remain logically consonant with the burden of
proof, it could be posited that Wyoming necessarily views insanity as affecting the capacity of the defendant to commit
crime or form intent. Therefore, it could be concluded that
guilt and insanity are inseparable at the trial on the basis of
Shaw.
E. A Proposal
Wyoming could, however, avoid the problems posed by a
separation of guilt and sanity and yet prevent the prejudicial
potential of a unitary trial in cases involving the insanity
defense. Rather than determining the "guilt" of the defendant, the first stage of the trial could be structured to determine only the identity of the person who committed the act
charged, i.e., guilt-in-fact. The resolution of the sanity issue
and the establishment of the mens rea required could then be
left to the second stage of the trial.
Whether the Wyoming court would view insanity as
affecting the capacity of a defendant to commit a crime or
affecting only the responsibility of the defendant is of little
consequence in this kind of procedure. The procedure pro161. 526 P.2d 344 (Wyo. 1974).
162. Bradford v. State, 234 Md. 505, 200 A.2d 150, 154 (1964). "Those jurisdictions which take the view that the prosecution has the burden of proving
the sanity of the accused assert that the fundamental rule of law requiring
the State to prove the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt
should logically extend to the issue of criminal responsibility."
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posed does not attempt to separate "guilt" from sanity. The
capacity or responsibility of a defendant with respect to the
crime charged and also the "guilt" of the defendant are determined by the whole procedure-not one particular stage.
Similarly, the problem of intent and insanity as manifested in Shaw and Hebard is effectively by-passed by this
procedure. Since both intent and insanity are determined in
the second stage without reference to a trial of defendant's
"guilt," it is irrelevant whether insanity is viewed as negativing intent or precluding criminal responsibility.
Finally, this procedure could remedy the problems in
expert testimony which might implicate the defendant in the
crime charged. Since the first stage would determine only
the identity of the perpetrator or guilt-in-fact, there is no
need of any kind of evidence of mental condition. The expert
would testify at the second stage only if it had been proved
in the first stage that the defendant committed the acts
charged. Consequently, the admissions or inculpatory statements related in the second stage by the expert would be
stripped of their potentially prejudicial effect.
CONCLUSION

This comment has attempted to describe some of the
problems in Wyoming's present laws relating to competency
to stand trial and the defense of insanity. The writer hopes
to have shed some light on the problems involved in presently
existing alternatives to Wyoming law, predict the relative
difficulty of implementing these alternatives in Wyoming,
and propose a workable alternative to the bifurcated trial.
In writing and researching this comment, the writer has
concluded that any impending revision of Wyoming law in
this area should be comprehensive. The interdependency of
most of the aspects discussed has become more and more apparent. Any pieccmeal approach to a revision of Wyoming
law in this area would be short-sighted if not calamitous.
CRAIG NEWMAN
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